This procedure amounts to a secured loan rather than a true pawn pursuant to KRS Chapter 226 KRS (4) directs that “[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language?” Moreover, “[w]hen language is clear and unambiguous, it will be held to mean what it plainly expresses.” Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1934). In KRS Chapter 226, the phrase “on deposit of personal property” is used repeatedly to define and to describe a pawn transaction. We must, therefore, construe this phrase according to the common, plain meaning of the word deposit. This appeal followed A naked bailment of goods to be kept for the depositor without reward, and to be returned when he shall require it? As used in Chapter KRS 226, deposit clearly requires that personal property be relinquished by its owner and committed to the physical custody of the pawnbroker. In its car title pledge transaction, KTL obtains only a lien on the customer’s car-not physical possession of the vehicle. Furthermore, among its reasons authorizing pawnbrokers to charge the high fees (20% of the unpaid principal balance), KRS explicitly cites the purpose of “storing and insuring the property?” (Emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to the unambiguous statutory language, the pawnbroker must have actual physical custody of the personal property-not merely constructive possession-in https://loansolution.com/installment-loans-al/ order to charge the interest and fees set out in KRS . In summary, we hold that KTL was not a pawnbroker as defined by KRS . Hence, it was not exempt from application of KRS Chapter 288 and it operated its business in violation of KRS , KRS , and KRS . As to the allegations that KTL’s business practices violated KRS of the Consumer Protection Act, we refrain from addressing this issue as the circuit court did not. Upon remand, we direct the circuit court to address this issue. For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand the order of the Fayette Circuit Court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. Deposit, n I concur with the majority opinion but do so for a slightly different reason. The majority opinion states that the issue is whether KTL was a pawnbroker and resolves the issue by determining that it was not. However, the Attorney General conceded in his argument of this case that KTL met the definition of “pawnbroker” as that term is defined in KRS . It likewise appears to me that KTL met the “pawnbroker” definition. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority opinion that KTL could not charge interest pursuant to KRS , since that statute should be construed as requiring the actual deposit of automobiles and not merely the deposit of keys and titles. The Attorney General moved for summary judgment or a temporary injunction against KTL. On January 8, 1998, the circuit court entered an order and opinion denying the Attorney General’s motion and finding that KTL was indeed a pawnbroker as defined by KRS . On the same date, the court entered an order dismissing the claim against KTL except for that portion relating to whether the actual fees charged by KTL were reasonable in relation to their costs. However, we find a significant difference between the Kentucky and Alabama statutes with respect to the breadth of the definition of a pawn transaction. KRS and KRS 226. 080 use the prepositional phrase “[loan or loaning] money on deposit of personal property ” (emphasis added) whereas the Alabama legislature has adopted a less restrictive and less specific adjective, “loan on the security of pledged goods”-which clearly has the potential for encompassing a wide range of transactions. Thus, while the analogy is helpful, we do not find the reasoning in Floyd to be controlling as to our Kentucky statutes on point.